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1367 and All That: Recodifying Federal
Supplemental Jurisdiction
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
When several authors of whom I was one participated in a heated exchange
over the new federal supplemental-jurisdiction statute' in 1991,2 about all we
could agree on was to bind the articles together in a single reprint. I sent my
parents a copy, and the response of my then eighty-one-year-old mother was a
gem: "My, what a lot of fur is flying!" At that point much of the fuss was about
whether the statute as written was well or poorly drafted and whether it lent itself
* Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. Yale, 1964; M. Phil. Oxford,
1967; J.D. Harvard, 1970. For research leave that has aided my work on this Article I am
grateful to the E.T. Bost Fund of the Duke University School of Law, and for hospitality and
collegiality during the leave to the RAND Corporation and its Institute for Civil Justice. For
comments on an earlier draft, thanks to Professors David Shapiro and Stephen 'Burbank;
remaining errors are, as always, mine.
1.28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). Because the focus of this Article is on policy issues of what
situations should and should not be included in a supplemental-jurisdiction statute's coverage,
and specifically on the limits for diversity cases in § 1367's subsection (b), quotation of the
statute in full here would be a waste of trees. The general authorization in subsection (a) and
the diversity case limits in subsection (b) read as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under
Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such
rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
Id. § 1367(a)-(b). Subsection (c), referred to in § 1367(a), deals with judicial discretion to
decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in enumerated types of circumstances.
2. See Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963 (1991); Thomas C. Arthur &
Richard D. Freer, Close Enough for Government Work- What Happens When Congress
Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding
or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40
EMORY L.J. 943 (1991) [hereinafter Rowe et al., Reply] (responding to Richard D. Freer,
Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991)); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., A Coda on
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991) [hereinafter Rowe et al., Coda].
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to unfortunate or unintended interpretations, issues that still spark controversy.3
The ongoing Federal Judicial Code Revision Project of the American Law
Institute ("ALI") to propose possible Judicial Code revisions in areas including
supplemental jurisdiction,4 however, permits a shift in focus to how the statute
might best be redrafted in light of the critiques, judicial experience, and policy
considerations.
This Article will first offer some general comments on the codification of the
supplemental-jurisdiction area. It then considers what coverage and exclusions
would be desirable in a redrafting of § 1367(b), the provision that now restricts
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. An Appendix offers a draft to
accomplish these changes if Congress were to choose limited revision within the
framework of the existing supplemental-jurisdiction statute, rather than the more
ambitious (and most admirable) recasting developed in the ALI Code Revision
Project. Those who would relish more fireworks will perhaps be disappointed, for
the level of agreement among some of the former combatants on what ends we
should now seek to achieve may turn out to be surprisingly high. My mother,
though, will probably be relieved.
II. THE SOMEWHAT REGRETTABLE NECESSITY OF
CODIFICATION
The law governing the federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction, previously
described in its various parts as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,5 had long been
3. Compare, e.g., Ellen S. Mouchawar, Note, The Congressional Resurrection of
Supplemental Jurisdiction in the Post-Finley Era, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1611, 1613 (1991)
("Section 1367... makes great strides in resolving much of the confusion surrounding the
doctrines" of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.), and Kristen M. Niemi, Note, The
"Noncontroversial" Statute: Have Expressed Concerns of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 Come to Light?,
72 U. Dr. MERCYL. REv. 397, 397 (1995) ("By implementing the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, Congress has effectively responded to the problems that initially required the statute's
creation."), with 16 ROBERT C. CASAD ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 106.40, at 106-
55 (3d ed. 1998) (describing § 1367(b)'s diversity case limits as revealing the statute's "'anti-
diversity bias,"' the drafters' failure to extend those limits to removing defendants as "totally
lacking in rationality," and the subsection's draftsmanship problems as making it "something
of an interpretive nightmare"). As one who participated in the drafting, see Rowe et al., Reply,
supra note 2, at 944 & n.4, and therefore must be totally lacking in rationality, I should perhaps
spare readers by quitting now. But in the hope that some of this language may be academic
hyperbole, or that I may have learned from the bracing experience of having mistakes I had a
part in making find their way into the Judicial Code, I shall try to draw on that experience in
discussing possible revisions to the statute.
4. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT,
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2 (1998) [hereinafter T.D. No. 2].
5. "Pendent!' or "pendent claim" jurisdiction generally referred to claims outside original
jurisdiction, but related to claims within original federal question jurisdiction, that were added
by plaintiffs against existing defendants. "Pendent party" jurisdiction referred mainly to efforts
by plaintiffs to add similarly related claims but against a defendant not already before the court.
Pendentjurisdiction in both these forms dealt with matters that were or could be part of a plain-
tiff's original complaint at least as far as the rules on claim and party joinder were concerned.
For the remaining large universe of claims added by defendants or later-joined parties such as
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developed by judicial decision with virtually no direct legislative focus on the
subject.6 Until 1989 there had been no major momentum toward codification,
probably because the practical workings ofjudicially developed doctrine in the
area had at least not been intolerable. To be sure, some Supreme Court decisions
were questionable in their reasoning and effects,7 and the field suffered from lack
of clarity in as yet unilluminated corners! Still, in broad outline, the Court's
guidance seemed to have produced a more or less livable degree of
accommodation between, on one hand, the limits on the federal courts' subject-
matter jurisdiction and, on the other hand, the economy, convenience, and
consistency offered by the rules on joinder of claims and parties.9 Case-by-case
development also had the virtue of permitting consideration of discrete aspects
of a complex area as they arose in concrete situations, rather than forcing an
third-party defendants, the term "ancillary jurisdiction" covered the addition of claims outside
original federal question or diversity jurisdiction but related to claims within it.
6. A limited exception had been 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1994), originally adopted in 1948,
authorizing original district court jurisdiction over "any civil action asserting a claim of unfair
competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant
variety protection or trademark laws." Id For pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in general, the
Supreme Court had required "careful attention to the relevant statutory language." Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976) ("Before it can be concluded that [pendent] jurisdiction
exists, a federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in
the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence.")
For the most part, however, given the lack of other statutes like § 1338(b), the relevant statutes
were those creating original jurisdiction, and the required judicial attention took the form of
drawing inferences about pendent or ancillary jurisdiction from statutes in which Congress had
focused only on original jurisdiction.
7. See, e.g., Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 27, 29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pointing out, in dissent
from decision against pendent party jurisdiction over a related state law claim against the
county in a federal civil rights action against a county official, that legislative history directly
addressed possible state law claims against local governments); Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (requiring unnamed class members with legally separate claims to
satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement individually, even though the class representatives
themselves had claims for more than the amount in controversy and the citizenship of unnamed
members would be disregarded for purposes of the complete diversity rule under Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921)); see also id. at 305-12 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the ancillary jurisdiction analysis ignored by the majority).
8. See, e.g., 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT EITAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3567.2, at 156 (2d ed. 1984) ("The Aldinger decision left much still to be answered on when
pendent parties can be brought into a federal action.... The subsequent lower court decisions
... do not fall into any single pattern."); 13 id. § 3523, at 104 (noting uncertainty about
ancillary jurisdiction when plaintiff sought to assert claim against third-party defendant either
as counterclaim or after removal). See generally 13 id. at 115 ("[]t... is difficult to discern
any single rationaling [sic] principle that will explain [the] diverse rules" of ancillary
jurisdiction.).
9. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 n.18 (1978) (listing the
Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions upholding ancillary jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims, impleader, cross-claims, and intervention of right); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (upholding the constitutional basis for pendent
claim jurisdiction when "the relationship between [a federal question] claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
'case'").
1998]
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attempt at broad codification with a comprehensive treatment of multifarious
circumstances that had arisen in only a few lower-court cases-or perhaps were
possible but had to be imagined in the abstract. Experience with the codification
effort when it took place in 1990 had left me, even before controversy about the
statute mounted in the following year, with doubts about whether the area was
better treated by legislation or by decisional law.
In 1989, though, the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Finley v. United States0
made some form of codification virtually imperative. First, Finley rejected
pendent party jurisdiction over a nondiverse state claim co-defendant in a Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") suit against the United States. Federal court
jurisdiction in FTCA actions being exclusive," no single forum was available to
hear the plaintiffs claims against both the government and a nonfederal
defendant in such a case; the plaintiff had to forgo or postpone claims against one
defendant, or bring parallel actions in state and federal court-with all the
duplication and chance of inconsistency that such a course entails. Second,
beyond the particular type of pendent party claim involved in Finley, the majority
stated that "with respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of
only claims, we will not assume that the full constitutional power has been
congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly."' 2
This statement cast doubt on long-accepted ancillary jurisdiction over such
joinder as that of third-party defendants, and further bespoke an interpretive
approach that seemed to banish hope that the Court would minimize any practical
harm resulting from its decision-or tolerate lower federal courts doing so.
Codification duly followed, and beyond the overruling of Finley it does have
advantages such as the elimination of the bedeviling pendent-ancillary distinction
and the addition in the present statute of clarity and definiteness in some respects.
Still, the experience at once shows down sides of codification and raises
questions about how the Court has often been coming at statutory interpretation
in this and other areas. At least until Congress can be persuaded to revisit the
statute, any error in drafting 3 is chiseled in stone. Wooden interpretive
approaches with heavy emphasis on plain language-whatever the apparent
legislative intent-increase the possibility that any gap or ambiguity will have
unintended consequences (be they fortunate or otherwise).
As a result, the care required in the drafting process can go beyond due to
excruciating. We are fortunate to have had Reporter John Oakley and his advisers
putting countless hours into the ALI's Revision Project, but Congress will not
always be so blessed. Heavy plain-language emphasis in interpretation also
creates an impulse toward great detail in drafting, with baleful effects in
encouraging prolix statutes-which have their own difficulties of interpretation,
10. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. 111996).
12. Finley, 490 U.S. at 549.
13. See, e.g., Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 2, at 961 n.91 (pointing out the "potentially
gaping hole" in § 1367(b)'s failure to bar supplemental jurisdiction over a claim of a
nondiverse co-plaintiff added under Rule 20 after the initial complete diversity filing).
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including the likelihood of sheer misreadings. 4 Although the urge toward detail
may be resistible, 5 it is compounded in this area by the great multiplicity of
situations in which supplemental-jurisdiction issues can arise. 6
The debate over interpretive methodology raises large questions beyond the
scope of this Article, but for me the experience with drafting and observing
judicial constructions of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute illustrates the
virtues of an interpretive approach that does not adhere too rigidly to literalistic
"plain meaning."' 7 Some degree of flexibility in trying to take into account
legislative intent-which can, after all, be deduced not only from legislative
history with its dangers of manipulation but also from the broader historical
background of an enactment and the mischiefs it seems to have been meant to
counter, plus the general structure as well as the particular words of a statute
itself-can result in greater fidelity to what the people's representatives were
trying to accomplish than judicial games of "gotcha."' 8 Plain-language
14. Others may share my experience of seeing bright students--some of whom will shortly
be drafting court opinions--stumble over the relatively concise provisions of present § 1367.
I shudder to think of what they, and busy judges, might do with a considerably more complex
statute.
15. See David L. Shapiro, Supplemental Jurisdiction: A Confession, an Avoidance, and a
Proposal, 74 IND. L.J. 211,218-20 & n.45 (1998) (arguing for less legislative detail and more
judicial discretion in fine-tuning the contours of federal jurisdiction, and offering a brief draft
statute codifying broad judicial discretion in exercise of supplemental jurisdiction).
16. See, e.g., Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A
Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 925-74 (1992) (discussing the
application of § 1367(a)-(b) to many possiblejoinder situations).
17. For a sensitive discussion of approaches to an interpretation of aspects of § 1367, see
Judge Louis Pollak's decision in Russ v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 961
F. Supp. 808, 819-20 (E.D. Pa. 1997). In support ofa non-literalistic method, the Russ opinion
points to the technical nature of the statute and the unlikelihood that most members of
Congress grasped its intricacies; the unambiguity of the legislative history on the point at issue;
the lack of litigant reliance interests on such a procedural statute in planning real-world
transactions; and the limited effect of the court's judicial construction in changing only the
forum where litigation would proceed, rather than governing substantive law. Id.
18. See id. at 820:
To retain this case in this court [by adopting a contested interpretation of §
1367 based on a literal reading] is to say to Congress: "We know what you meant
to say, but you didn't quite say it. So the message from us in the judicial branch
to you in the legislative branch is: 'Gotcha! And better luck next time."' Such a
message is not required by the separation of powers.
An irony with plain-language interpretation in the context of § 1367 is that it can lead to
expansive readings of federal jurisdiction, in arguable or even clear disharmony with the aim
of Congress and in tension with judicial leanings-especially among conservative
judges-toward narrow constructions of the federal courts' jurisdiction. See, e.g., City of
Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 118 S. Ct. 523 (1997) (Court opinion by Justice
O'Connor for a seven-Justice majority) (reading § 1367(a) as establishing supplemental
jurisdiction in a removed federal-question case over a related state law claim for an appellate-
type, on-the-record review of local administrative action); id. at 535 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting,
joined by Stevens, J.) ("The Court's expansive reading... takes us far from anything Congress
conceivably could have meant. Cross-system appeals, if they are to be introduced into our
federal system, should stem from the National Legislature's considered and explicit decision.")
1998]
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approaches, with their stress on the impropriety of other than highly literal
readings of enacted text, may focus too narrowly and theoretically on the judicial
role in isolation 19-to the detriment of forging a workable, practical relationship
between the federal courts and Congress. 21
III. POLICY DECISIONS IN THE RECODIFICATION OF
§ 1367(b)
When Congress adopted § 1367 in 1990 as part of a package of measures
implementing recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee, one
goal-however imperfectly achieved, as became apparent soon afterward-was
to put through only noncontroversial aspects2' and save any foreseeably divisive
issues for later debate. That intention, coupled with the somewhat hurried
circumstances of the bill's adoption late in the 101st Congress,' constrained the
codification to making no major deliberate changes in preexisting decisional law
apart from overruling Finley. The circumstances today eliminate those constraints
and also provide the benefit of several years' experience under the new law,
permitting reflection about what goals should be pursued in a revised statute. This
part of the Article. considers key issues in what should come within or fall outside
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases.
A. Complete State-Citizen Diversity and the Kroger Rule
If there are serious advocates of entirely abandoning the complete diversity
requirement for state-citizen diversity cases, they have escaped my attention.
Given the way the system has developed in the almost two centuries since
Strawbridge v. Curtiss' established the requirement that all plaintiffs must be of
(citation omitted).
19. See Recent Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 858, 858 (1996) ("Whatever its ideological end,
a court usurps the lawmaking authority of Congress when it engages in rigid textualism to
defeat a clearly expressed legislative intent.").
[R]igid adherence to the plain language of § 1367 is an inappropriate approach
to statutory interpretation. Few would disagree that the role of courts in
interpreting statutes is "to ascertain and effectuate the 'intentions' of Congress"
and "to subordinate [judicial preferences] to the will of Congress." Indeed,
textualists hold out this definition of the judicial role tojustify limitations upon
judicial discretion. When . . . a court permits strict textualism to trump
unambiguous indications of legislative intent, it fails to enforce congressional will
and thereby usurps lawmaking authority.
Id. at 861-62 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
20. See Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(noting that "Congress and the courts, however different their respective roles, are parts of a
single government").
21. See, e.g., id at 819 (referring to "assurances made by [Congressional sponsors] to their
colleagues that the several provisions of Title III of the Judicial Improvement[s] Act of 1990
were 'noncontroversial').
22. See Rowe et al., Coda, supra note 2, at 1004-05 (describing the process of introducing,
considering, and enacting the supplemental-jurisdiction statute in July-October 1990).
23. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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completely diverse citizenship from all defendants, it makes sense-despite the
great arbitrariness of many of the rule's applications-not to do away with the
rule across the board now. Minimal diversity under the general diversity
jurisdiction would likely lead to a large expansion in the federal courts' caseload
of state law disputes, many of them with little need for the federal forum-as
would often be the case when just one or a few diverse parties were involved in
litigation with several parties on both sides who all shared citizenship of the same
state.
Assuming retention of the Strawbridge requirement, it is also defensible-and
in my view preferable-to keep the basic rule of Owen Equipment & Erection Co.
v. Kroger,24 under which a diversity plaintiff who chose the federal forum may not
use supplemental jurisdiction to add a claim against a nondiverse third-party
defendant. Even absent collusion (which might, if detected, be dealt with under
§ 13592), it could be all too easy without the Kroger rule for a plaintiff to evade
the complete diversity requirement by a fairly uncomplicated progression: sue a
diverse defendant in federal court; wait for the predictable, if not certain,
impleader of a reimbursement claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant
against whom the plaintiff also wanted to bring a claim; and then add that claim
under the seventh sentence of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a).26 Indeed, to
avoid a serious threat to the Strawbridge requirement, the supplemental-
jurisdiction statute should also make it clear that a plaintiff may not bring a
complete diversity case and then turn it into a minimal diversity one by amending
the complaint and adding a nondiverse co-plaintiff under the first sentence of
Federal Rule 20(a). 7 If nothing else, Congress should plug this "potentially
gaping hole"2" in the present statute.
B. Complete or Minimal Diversity in Alienage Cases
The application of the complete diversity requirement in cases involving alien
parties is, to put it gently, curious. The lower federal courts have settled on
interpretations that for original jurisdiction always require complete diversity
among state-citizen adversaries in cases involving aliens and sometimes, but not
always, regard the presence of aliens (without regard to whether they are citizens
of the same or different foreign states) on both sides as destroying complete
24. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994) ("A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or
joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.").
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) ("The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party
defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff .....
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 20(a):
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will
arise in the action.
28. Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 2, at 961 n.91.
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diversity. 9 Under § 1332(a)(2) with its authorization ofjurisdiction over civil ac-
tions between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state," in
general the complete diversity rule applies;3" and in particular the presence of
aliens of whatever nationality on both sides, with a state citizen or citizens on one
side, means that there is no jurisdiction." In effect, the rest of the world functions
as a single state for purposes of the complete diversity requirement in §
1332(a)(2) cases. But under § 1332(a)(3) on jurisdiction over actions between
"citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties," while complete state-citizen diversity is always required, the
dominant interpretation plausibly reads the "additional parties" language as
meaning that the involvement of aliens-of the same or different nationality from
each other, and on either side or both-in the same case does not destroy federal
jurisdiction. 2
"Exactly what sense all this makes rather eludes us." 33 Me, too. Indeed, beyond
its arbitrariness in producing "a dysfunctional crazy quilt of results," 34 application
of the complete diversity rule in many types of cases involving aliens conflicts
with the reasons for the alienage jurisdiction, commonly taken to be protection
of aliens against possible state court bias and concern for American relations with
foreign governments. "The mere presence of aliens on both sides of the
controversy does nothing to allay concerns that the in-state party will receive
more favorable treatment. . . .More important, the international relations
concerns remain. Indeed, the presence of aliens on both sides of the controversy
29. Special problems in applying the complete diversity requirement to alienage cases are
raised by the resident-alien proviso in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994), added in 1988: "For the
purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to the United States
for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is
domiciled." Id. See generally, e.g., Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 57-61 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing the legislative history of the 1988 revision and concluding that Congress did not
intend to expand the scope of diversity jurisdiction with the amendment to § 1332). These
issues largely deal with the initial invocation of original alienage jurisdiction, rather than
supplemental jurisdiction, and the body of this Article will not deal with them.
30. See, e.g., Simon Holdings PLC Group v. Klenz, 878 F. Supp. 210, 211 (M.D. Fla.
1995).
31. See, e.g., id; Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 106 F.3d 494,
498-99 (3d Cir. 1997).
32. See Dresser, 106 F.3d at 497-500. A competing interpretation rejected in Dresser, id.
at 500, is that the reference to aliens as "additional parties" in § 1332(a)(3) means that there
may or may not be jurisdiction over a case involving completely diverse state-citizen
adversaries and aliens on both sides, with jurisdiction existing only if the aliens are not among
the principal adverse parties. See also L'Europ6enne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela,
700 F. Supp. 114, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding the presence of diverse U.S. corporations
insufficient for jurisdiction when aliens were in fact the principal adverse parties).
33. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Posner, C.J.) (concluding a discussion of the application of § 1332(a)(2)-(3) to cases involving
aliens on both sides).
34. Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 2, at 954; see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing
Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L.
REv. 963, 967-68 (1979) (discussing the application of the complete diversity rule in alienage
cases and its misfit with purposes of alienage jurisdiction).
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heightens those federal concerns."" Further, a plaintiff's ability to destroy
diversity in a case involving an alien or aliens on only one side by joining a co-
defendant of the same state citizenship as the plaintiff, or to prevent removal even
in a complete diversity case by naming a home-state co-defendant," lets citizens
manipulate their actions to keep an alien from federal court, no matter how
serious the potential bias or the foreign relations implications." Accordingly, if
it is politically feasible in light of caseload concerns, it would be highly desirable
for minimal rather than complete diversity to become the rule for alienage cases.
That end might be attained by an unlikely (but conceivable, in light of the
concerns underlying alienage jurisdiction) Supreme Court reinterpretation of §
1332(a)(2), or by a rewriting of § 1332-or, at least in large part, by the currently
contemplated revision of § 1367 on supplemental jurisdiction.
Without going into technical details,38 suffice it to say here that the
supplemental-jurisdiction statute could-and in my view should-go far toward
making minimal rather than complete diversity the rule for all alienage cases. Any
properly joined alien opposing any properly joined state citizen for the amount
in controversy should suffice, no matter who else was involved.3 9 The use of
supplemental jurisdiction to abandon the complete diversity rule for alienage
cases would have the virtue of permitting judicial control over too-ready use of
alien parties to invoke § 1332 jurisdiction, because federal courts under § 1367(c)
have discretion not to invoke supplemental jurisdiction even when it technically
exists.
C. Claims for Less Than the Jurisdictional Amount
When it comes to the general state-citizen diversity jurisdiction, I remain a
confirmed abolitionist.4" As long as the jurisdiction remains on the books, though
(and that is likely to be a very long time, given the sentiments and political
effectiveness of the trial bar), supplemental jurisdiction should be so defined as
not to hamper unduly its workability by trammeling the appropriate use ofjoinder
devices. Avoiding truck-sized holes in the complete diversity requirement by
maintaining the Kroger principle is one thing; excluding below-limit claims
35. Dresser, 106 F.3d at 499-500.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994) (allowing removal in other than federal question cases
"only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought").
37. See Rowe, supra note 34, at 967-68.
38. See infra Appendix.
39. Difficulties would arise with initially establishing jurisdiction in cases involving parties
such as corporations and associations having multiple citizenships, which could be a mix of
citizen and alien. Here, supplemental jurisdiction seems likely to be no help because the matter
would not involve adding related claims to matters already before a federal court. Leaving such
cases outside the federal courts' alienage jurisdiction, however, should be at worst a tolerable
result; when a party has mixed state and alien citizenship to begin with, the concerns for anti-
alien bias and foreign relations effects are lessened, and the justifications for a minimal rather
than complete diversity regime thus diminished.




related to those already before a federal court in a diversity case-which the law
at least before § 1367 generally had done4 '-is another. For clarity, I should
stress that I see no need to change the present aggregation rules governing what
is required for initial invocation of original diversity jurisdiction. These rules
generally forbid summing up below-limit claims of different parties for purposes
of the amount in controversy requirement, except in the relatively few types of
cases (such as suits by joint property owners or partnerships) where claims are
regarded as legally joint.42
1. Class Actions
At least before § 1367, three key Supreme Court decisions governed federal
court jurisdiction over diversity class actions.43 Under Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble44 it has been the law for almost eighty years that for purposes of
complete diversity, the only citizenships of class members that count are those of
the named representatives. The rule is arbitrary and subject to manipulation by
choice of the representatives to create or destroy complete diversity, but it has
virtues enough to warrant its retention. It provides definiteness and relative ease
of administration as opposed to the difficult or impossible job of figuring out the
41. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (requiring unnamed class
members with legally separate claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement
individually, even though class representatives themselves had claims for more than the amount
in controversy and the citizenship of unnamed members would be disregarded for purposes of
the complete diversity rule under Supreme Tribe ofBen-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921));
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939) (dismissing the case as to all individual
plaintiffs who could not show that their claims involved the jurisdictional amount). Some cases
under § 1367 hold that the statute has overruled Zahn and Clark, permitting the inclusion of
related below-limit claims when the individual claims of the class representatives or of some
individual plaintiffs in a non-class action do satisfy the amount requirement. Most prominent
among these are Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th
Cir. 1996) (stating that in a non-class action, § 1367 overrules Clark), and In re Abbott
Laboratories, 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that in a class action, § 1367
overrules Zahn). My concern in this part of the Article is not with the rightness or wrongness
of these results under present law, but with what-as a matter of policy-a revised § 1367
should seek to achieve on the issues faced in these cases. For an argument that Abbott and
Stromberg reach a result consistent with the purposes of § 1367, but for overly text-bound
reasons, see Mark C. Cawley, Note, The Right Result for the Wrong Reasons: Permitting
Aggregation of Claims Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in Multi-Plaintiff Diversity Litigation, 73
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1045 (1998).
42. See generally 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ErAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3704 (2d ed. 1985) (describing aggregation doctrines).
43. Actually, the Snyder and Zahn decisions on jurisdictional amount issues, discussed
below in the text, technically governed in some federal question cases when they were rendered
in 1969 and 1973 respectively. But the virtually complete elimination in 1980 of the amount
in controversy requirements for federal question cases,-see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."), has confined the effect of these decisions almost
exclusively to diversity class actions.
44. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
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citizenship of each unnamed class member, and the contrary rule would largely
eliminate diversity class actions even when federal jurisdiction over a far-flung
class in a state law matter might be useful. By contrast to the jurisdiction-
widening effect of Ben-Hur, Snyder v. Harris in 1969 restricted federal
jurisdiction over class actions by forbidding in most cases the aggregation of
below-limit claims to satisfy an applicable amount in controversy requirement.
Although criticized," Snyder keeps out of federal court agglomerations of small
state law claims that could not be there individually. With Ben-Hur on the books,
the opposite outcome in Snyder would have let in such cases (for example, a rate
overcharge claim against a local utility) even if they were highly localized-as
long as an adequate out-of-state member of a dominantly in-state class could be
found to serve as the named representative.
The third and most restrictive decision, Zahn v. International Paper Co., 7 has
few defenders." Zahn held that in a class action involving legally separate claims,
even when all the named representatives have claims satisfying the amount
requirement, unnamed members with jurisdictionally insufficient claims could not
tag along in federal court; only unnamed class members with jurisdictionally
sufficient claims could be part of the class. The Zahn rule poses the danger of
forcing separate litigation in federal and state court if those with large enough
claims proceed individually or as part of a heavy-hitters-only class in federal
court, and it can trigger litigation over the size of unnamed members' claims in
a mass tort. 9 Leaving Ben-Hur and Snyder intact for original jurisdiction, while
unmistakably overruling Zahn in a revised supplemental-jurisdiction statute, then,
should produce a coherent and workable jurisdictional scheme for diversity class
actions. And again, the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction would
let federal courts control overzealous efforts to gain access to the federal forum;
in addition, of course, cases coming within federal jurisdiction with Zahn
overruled would still have to clear considerable hurdles for class certification.
45. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
46. See, e.g., 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1756, at 71 (2d ed. 1986) (viewing the Snyder result as "somewhat at variance with the broad
binding effect given to judgments under the amended [class action] rule" and "insensitive to
a major purpose of the amendment to Rule 23").
47. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
48. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 1756, at 75-76 nn.31-32 (citing and quoting
several critical articles, and two favorable ones); McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 972-73 (citing
the criticism of Zahn for being "unduly restrictive," and pointing out the anomaly that it
mandates the application of the jurisdictional amount requirement to the claims of unnamed
class members, whereas Ben-Hur calls for looking to citizenships of the named class
representatives only).
49. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond the Class Action Rule: An Inventory of Statutory
Possibilities to Improve the Federal Class Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186, 193-94 & n.43
(1996) (criticizing Zahn for creating the danger of splitting related litigation, and citing case





Although the problem of below-limit claims in multiparty, non-class litigation
has received less attention in commentary"0 than has the parallel issue in the class
context, case law under the present supplemental-jurisdiction statute has
highlighted the matter and has illustrated the practicality of a change in pre-§
1367 doctrine. Under Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,"t even fully diverse claimants with
below-limit claims related to those of diversity plaintiffs could not be joined to
an action otherwise properly in federal court. Several decisions have found this
restriction to be lifted by § 1367; and whatever their defensibility as a matter of
statutory interpretation, the Republic has not tottered.52
Like overruling Zahn, eliminating the Clark limit-and also permitting the
addition of related below-limit claims by a plaintiff against a diverse co-
defendant-would let federal courts (with the discretionary control authorized by
the supplemental-jurisdiction statute) resolve all aspects of a related controversy,
in contrast to the action-splitting effect of pre-§ 1367 law. In contrast to the class
action context, though, complete diversity should still be required as to all
adversaries. Overruling Clark while also extending to non-class actions the Ben-
Hur practice of overlooking the citizenship of others than the initial adversaries
would create a huge gap in the Strawbridge rule, along with an anomaly in letting
smaller claims by and against nondiverse parties tag along while larger ones could
not.
D. Rule 19, Rule 24, and Supplemental Jurisdiction
Speaking of anomalies, there is the vexed question of what to do about one that
existed in prior case law and that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute attempted
to abolish. Under governing decisional law before 1990, a nondiverse intervenor
under Rule 24(a)(2) 3 could be joined as a plaintiff or a defendant (and, in the
case of a defendant, then claimed against by the plaintiff) as long as the
50. For a recent discussion of the issue and some of the cases, see Michael A. Baldassare,
Comment, Pandora's Box or Treasure Chest?: Circuit Courts Face 28 U.S.C. § 1367's Effect
on Multi-Plaintiff Diversity Actions, 27 SEToN HALL L. REV. 1497, 1517-24 (1997).
51. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
52. See, e.g., Gandolfo v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 558, 561-62 (D.N.J. 1996). The
cases are divided, see id., but the division has been over the construction of the existing statute
and has largely not addressed the policy issue considered here.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2):
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
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intervenor did not meet the standards for "indispensability" under Rule 19(b). 4
But if the question of that same outsider's joinder arose at the initiative of one
already a party to the action, under the very similar terms of Rule 19(a)(2)(i),55
joinder had to be denied.56 Section 1367 sought to eliminate this anomaly in
diversity cases by excluding from supplemental jurisdiction
claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule... 19... or 24
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or ... claims by persons proposed
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene
as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332."7
The rationale behind thus resolving the anomaly by restricting supplemental
jurisdiction, rather than broadening it, was that-like failing to codify the Kroger
rule barring supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse
third-party defendants 58-it could make evasion of the complete diversity rule too
easy. Nondiverse outsiders could wait for a diverse plaintiff to sue and then seek
to intervene as plaintiffs, or a diverse plaintiff could sue and then wait for an
intervenor-defendant to join and be subject to addition of the plaintiff's claim.59
Eliminating the pre-§ 1367 anomaly seems to make sense, because the
underlying reality of the outsider's relation to existing litigation can be the same
whether the source of the initiative for possible joinder comes from the outsider
under Rule 24 or from insiders under Rule 19.60 The present absolute bar,
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b):
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as
described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first,
to what extent ajudgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial
to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether ajudgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i):
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if... (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest ....
56. See, e.g., 7C WRIGHTrETAL., supra note 46, § 1917, at 472-81; McLaughlin, supra note
16, at 952.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
59. See Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 2, at 956-57.
60. For this reason, I question the proposal in the ALI's Revision Project to reinstate the
pre-§ 1367 rule. See T.D. No. 2, supra note 4, at 2 (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)); id. at
70 (Comment c-9). A point that can be made in defense of the anomaly is that it is harsher to
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however, may be too harsh. Satisfying the requirements for intervention of right
implies inadequacy of the outsider's representation by existing parties.6 '
Moreover, although the federal courts may sometimes avoid prejudice to
outsiders (and possibly also to existing parties) by finding the outsiders
indispensable and thus dismissing the case for refiling in a state court where all
may be joined without jurisdictional difficulties, a single nonfederal forum may
not always be available; reliance on such dismissals could put artificial pressure
on the indispensable-necessary distinction. Accordingly, a softening of the
joinder limit for Rule 19 and Rule 24 cases alike seems in order. A good way to
do that may be by adopting language found in a draft prepared for the Federal
Courts Study Committee, permitting supplemental jurisdiction in such cases "if
necessary to prevent substantial prejudice to a party or third-party."62 Further,
given the focus in Rules 19 and 24 on possible effects on interests of both insiders
and outsiders without regard to their alignment, the qualification should apply
alike to parties intervening or being joined whether as plaintiffs or defendants.63
exclude one who is seeking to intervene than one whose joinder is sought only by existing
parties. See McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 966. But the relationship of the outsider to the
litigation, and the effects on the interests of the outsider and the existing parties, can be
identical-and it is on these effects, not the source of the initiative for thejoinder, that Rules
19 and 24 mainly focus. The anomaly also means that the addition of the same outsider might
be sought successively in the same case under Rule 19 and then Rule 24, with joinder first
denied and intervention later allowed. See Aman v. Kelbaugh, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1314, 1315
(4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam):
The [intervenors] could not have been joined under Rule 19(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because joinder would have destroyed diversity
jurisdiction. However, tested by the factors mentioned in Rule 19(b), they were
dispensable. Though their joinder was unnecessary, they were not precluded from
intervening as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) when it became apparent that
they were not adequately represented by the existing parties.
Cf Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co., 16 F.2d 657, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1927) (allowing
intervention by a nondiverse party that had previously been dismissed to retain jurisdiction).
See generally Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922)
(stating that diversity jurisdiction is not "defeated by the intervention, by leave of the court, of
a party whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the original
parties").
61. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (permitting intervention of right when an outsider satisfies
the rule's criteria for interest that may be affected by litigation, "unless the applicant's interest
is adequately represented by existing parties").
62. 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND SuncOMMrrTE REPORTS
568 (1990). The reference to its being "necessary" to prevent prejudice would preserve the
principle of dismissing when the party seeking to intervene or sought to be joined was regarded
as "indispensable," because the Rule 19(b) factors that can favor dismissal include the extent
of prejudice, the possibility of reducing or avoiding the prejudice, and the adequacy of other
remedies (most commonly, the availability of a state court forum). See supra note 54 (text of
Rule 19(b)).
63. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 952-70 (canvassing the several alignments
of plaintiff and defendant joinder under Rules 19 and 24).
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E. Claims by Diversity Plaintiffs in a Defensive Posture
Before the adoption of § 1367, the lower federal courts had generally refused
to apply Kroger's bar on ancillary jurisdiction over diversity plaintiffs' claims
against nondiverse third-party defendants to cases in which the plaintiff s claim
was a compulsory counterclaim to a claim already added by the third-party
defendant against the plaintiff.' That seemed sensible, even when the plaintiff
had chosen the forum by filing in federal court, to promote efficiency and fairness
and also because the danger of plaintiffs easily circumventing the complete
diversity rule is considerably less than in the Kroger situation itself: there, the
plaintiff need not depend on-and pay the price of-being claimed against in
order to add the claim against the third-party defendant. 65 The same went for
another prominent instance of diversity plaintiffs asserting claims in a defensive
posture-when they were counterclaimed against and sought under Federal Rule
14(b)6 6 to assert an indemnity claim against a nondiverse third party. 6
Limited case law under § 1367, however, has read the terms of the statute as
banning such claims by plaintiffs even though the claims are brought
defensively.68 Whatever the interpretive pros and cons of these decisions, the
results seem unfortunate and worth overruling in a revised § 1367. One way or
another-subject, as always, to the discretionary control allowed by the
statute-supplemental jurisdiction should be defined to include claims asserted
by plaintiffs in a defensive posture in response to claims against them.
F. Application of§ 1367 in Removed Cases
The number of supplemental-jurisdiction issues that can arise because of
removal from state to federal court is surprisingly large, 69 and for the most part
I am happy to leave them to the contributions of the unsurpassed expert on the
64. See, e.g., Finkle v. Gulf& Western Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1984);
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 959-60 (7th Cir. 1982); see also, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 14(a) ("The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the
third-party plaintiff.").
65. See McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 945-48.
66. FED. R. CIv. P. 14(b) ("When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, the plaintiff
may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would
entitle a defendant to do so.").
67. See, e.g., Basic Mach. Co. v. Ketom Constr., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 542, 543-45 (M.D.N.C.
1988) (involving a third party, against which the plaintiff wished to add its own third-party
claim that had already been joined as a third-party defendant by the original defendant, but the
court viewed the plaintiffs claim as coming under Rule 14(b)).
68. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Aldridge, 906 F. Supp. 866, 867-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Guaranteed Sys., Inc. v. American Nat'l Can Co., 842 F. Supp. 855, 856-58 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
Both cases involved attempts by plaintiffs facing counterclaims from original defendants to add
claims against new third-party defendants under Rule 14(b).
69. See generally Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases: An
Unsurveyed Frontier ofCongress' Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (1993).
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subject, Professor Joan Steinman.7 ° Here, I offer three brief points. First, barring
unlikely revisions of a sort that would create new doubt, there is no need to
include in the text of § 1367 anything making it explicit that it applies to removed
cases as well as to those originally filed in federal court. The Supreme Court has
recently settled that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute "applies with equal
force to cases removed to federal court as to cases initially filed there; a removed
case is necessarily one 'of which the district courts have original jurisdiction.",' 7'
Second, the statute needs no provisions limiting the use of supplemental
jurisdiction by removing defendants; the complete diversity rule, and efficient
judicial administration, do not require such complications. 72
A third and somewhat more vexing issue is whether diversity plaintiffs in
removed cases, not having chosen the federal forum, should be under fewer
restraints when it comes to adding either new nondiverse parties or claims against
nondiverse parties added by others.73 Here, the ALI Project offers a cogent new
proposal, providing a wide range of options to the district judge when a plaintiff
seeks to add a supplemental claim that would not be allowed in an originally filed
case:
If after removal of a civil action the plaintiff moves to amend the complaint
to join a supplemental claim against an additional defendant that-is subject
to the jurisdictional restriction of subsection (c) [counterpart in the ALI
proposal to present § 1367(b)], the district court may either deny such
joinder, or permit such joinder and remand the entire action to the State court
from which the action was removed, or permit such joinder without
remanding the action.74
The proposal goes on to give guidance for the exercise ofjudicial discretion in
such cases and to make it clear that the court would have power to retain the case
with the added claim despite a failure to satisfy diversity requirements. This
approach would replace current § 1447(e)7 and would provide a sensible
compromise between, on the one hand, carte blanche for plaintiffs who were
clever enough to file a case likely to get removed and, on the other hand, overly
stiff restrictions on those who neither wanted nor sought to be in federal court. It
appeals to me, and it might even satisfy Professor Steinman.
70. See id.; Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Removal, and the
ALI Revision Project, 74 IND. L.J. 75 (1998).
71. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 118 S. Ct. 523, 530 (1997)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994)).
72. See Steinman, supra note 69, at 356-58.
73. See generally id. at 333-55 (surveying various configurations of possible added claims
by plaintiffs in removed diversity cases); id at 355-56 (concluding that § 1367(b) should apply
identically in originally filed and removed cases "unless plaintiffs could establish that they had
not acted strategically in filing in state court," but also expressing doubt that these "negative
answers to the questions of supplemental jurisdiction... are the optimal answers") (emphasis
in original).
74. T.D. No. 2, supra note 4, at 3 (proposing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1994) ("If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny




The voices offering suggestions on how best to revise § 1367 are appropriately
many, and this Article offers one kibitzer's advice. In large part my views square
with positions taken in the ALI Revision Project, which of course covers much
more than the diversity case restrictions focused on here and treats those other
areas admirably. The only two significant points on which I question the ALl
Project are its retention of the complete diversity rule for alienage cases7 6 and its
reintroduction of the Rule 19-Rule 24 anomaly. 7 The former involves a major
policy decision, about which there can be appropriate concern both for expansion
of federal jurisdiction by a leap into somewhat unknown territory and for the
political viability of a proposal that would make minimal diversity the rule in
alienage cases. The latter is a secondary issue that rarely arises. We can all be
glad that the current process, in contrast to the circumstances surrounding passage
of the original § 1367, not only permits the consideration of policy issues such as
these, but also provides the time and atmosphere for deliberation in which we can
transcend yesterday's battles and focus on what now counts most-doing the job
as well as possible.
76. Compare T.D. NO. 2, supra note 4, at xx-xxi (describing a change from an earlier draft
that would have repealed the complete diversity rule for alienage cases), with supra text
accompanying notes 29-39 (arguing for minimal diversity in alienage cases).
77. Compare T.D. No. 2, supra note 4, at 2 (proposing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) allowing
jurisdiction in a diversity case over a supplemental claim if joined by a nonindispensable
intervenor), with supra text accompanying notes 53-63 (arguing for parallel treatment of Rule




THE DEVIL WE KNOW: A LIMITED REVISION OF § 1367(b)
The ALL Project's comprehensive proposal is an excellent job and in my view
deserving of adoption. It would also be understandable, however, if practitioners,
judges, legislators, and even academics felt concern at the degree of conceptual
change it would bring about in an area where we are still settling in with a
relatively new statute. If it were felt preferable to make more incremental changes
to carry out revisions along the lines of those urged in this Article, it should be
possible to do so with some amendments to the text of the existing § 1367(b). The
ALI Project's proposals for subsequent parts of the statute-on discretion,
removed cases, and tolling-all seem to be improvements well worth adopting no
matter how the earlier definitional and diversity restriction subsections are
treated. What follows as a starting loint is a possible revision of § 1367(b) that
adheres as closely as possible to the present provision while making the changes
discussed in this Article, along with explanatory notes. Additions are
underscored; language taken from the present statute but shifted in position is
[bracketed]; deletions are stieke tiett... .
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, [when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over sue-I the following claims would be inconsistent with the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332LaX(.,] the district courts shall not
have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)-
(1) over claims by persons named or proposed to be joined as plaintiffs
under Rule 20 of such rules, or
(2) except as to claims asserted by plaintiffs in a defensive posture in
response to claims made against them,
LAI over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule
14-4-9- or 20,-or2-4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
(B) or unless necessary to prevent substantial prejudice to a party or
third party, over claims by plaintiffs against, or as plaintiffs by, persons
proposed to be joined as-pl n.i. under Rule 19 of such rules, or
seeking to intervene asp ,.i..iff under Rule 24 of such rules;.
Notes on the statutory draft:
1. Retention of rule references. This revision would retain the present statute's
practice of referring to various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The ALl
Project's proposal would eliminate all such references, making the statute perhaps
more accessible to those not steeped in federal civil practice and also saving it
from obsolescence in case of major revisions in the joinder rules. The rule
references do provide some specificity, and so far reliance on them by itself (as
opposed to omissions that may have led to unintended results) does not seem to
have been problematic.
2. Moving the "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction . . . would be
inconsistent" language from back to front. This proviso, at the end of present §
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1367(b), may have been ignored or given insufficient effect by some courts,
although it could permit exercises of supplemental jurisdiction over claims
between nondiverse parties in situations that were allowed by case law before
Finley and codification.78 Moving the clause from the end of subsection (b) to
near the beginning would formally make no substantive change but should at least
highlight language that is now too readily ignored.
3. Limiting applicability to jurisdictional requirements of subparagraph
1332(a)(1). This deceptively small addition takes advantage of the structure of
the provision conferring original diversity jurisdiction to allow supplemental
jurisdiction over below-limit claims by or against parties permissively joined
under Rule 20 and unnamed members in a Rule 23 class action, and also to make
minimal diversity the rule for supplemental jurisdiction in alienage cases (without
creating original jurisdiction over cases involving mixed-citizenship entities79).
The latter is achieved because state-citizen diversity is conferred by subparagraph
(a)(1) of § 1332, with the alienage provisions in subparagraphs (a)(2)-(3)-so
that complete diversity would limit supplemental jurisdiction only in state-citizen
diversity cases under (a)(1). Letting below-limit claims tag along is accomplished
by the reference to subparagraph (a)(1) because the jurisdictional amount
requirement is in the text at the beginning of § 1332(a) before its breakdown into
subparagraphs. The complete diversity requirement continues to apply in
permissive-joinder situations because of the mention of Rule 20 in § 1367(b)'s
limits, but does not constrain unnamed class members because of the omission of
Rule 23. And the Snyder v. Harris limit on aggregating class claims for invoking
original jurisdiction" survives because § 1367 affects only supplemental
jurisdiction once original jurisdiction properly attaches.
If any move were made toward minimal diversity in alienage cases, it would be
wise at the same time to deal with the problems caused by the resident-alien
proviso in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).8' (Even if nothing is done about supplemental
jurisdiction, the problems are messy enough to be worth cleaning up.82 For
present purposes, suffice it to say that the proviso, meant to deny diversity
jurisdiction over an action between a state citizen and a resident alien domiciled
in the same state, used broad language that could unintentionally expand diversity
jurisdiction in cases involving other alignments and in some instances could even
raise constitutional problems.) One articulation that might do the job of confining
the proviso to excluding the situations it was meant to cover would be to replace
the present language in § 1332(a) with, "Original jurisdiction under this section
or section 1335 shall not rest upon adversity between an alien admitted to the
United States for permanent residence and a citizen of the State in which such
78. See, e.g., Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 2, at 959-60. For a lucid discussion of the text
and legislative history of this clause of§ 1367(b) and how it might be given effect under the
current statute, see Darren J. Gold, Note, Supplemental Jurisdiction over Claims by Plaintiffs
in Diversity Cases: Making Sense of28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), 93 Mid. L. REv. 2133, 2150-57
(1995).
79. See supra note 39.
80. See supra text accompanying note 45.
81. See supra note 29.
82. See, e.g., Arai v. Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Haw. 1991).
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alien is domiciled." Another possibility appeared in an early draft for the ALI's
Revision Project: "A person who has been admitted to the United States for
permanent residence is not eligible for the jurisdiction conferred by subsection
(a) [of § 1332] with respect to any claim between such person and a citizen of the
State in which such person is domiciled."83
4. Claims by plaintiffsjoined under Rule 20. Subparagraph (1) would plug the
"potentially gaping hole" 4 in the Strawbridge complete diversity rule created by
the omission of a restriction on nondiverse parties seeking to join as plaintiffs
under Federal Rule 20. The "named or proposed to be joined" language is
intended to overcome a possible ambiguity that let one court reason that joinder
would be permissible as to originally named parties but not subsequently joined
ones.8" Treatment of claims by plaintiffs joined under Rule 20 is in. a separate
subparagraph because the "defensive posture" and "substantial prejudice"
softenings should not apply to permissivejoinder of plaintiffs, a context with great
potential for easy and widespread circumvention of the complete diversity rule.
5. Claims asserted by plaintiffs in a defensive posture. This language at the
beginning of subparagraph (2) attempts to implement the change advocated in the
text accompanying notes 64-68 supra. The "nesting" of two clauses under this
introductory "defensive posture" language makes it applicable to both clauses (A)
and (B), with the further "substantial prejudice" alternative basis for an exception
allowing supplemental jurisdiction applicable only to necessary parties and
intervenors under clause (B).
6. Deletion of Rules 19 and 24from subparagraph (2) (A). Treatment of these
rules would be moved to subparagraph (2)(B) so as to bring all cases of necessary-
party joinder and intervention under a single standard.86
7. Claims by and against Rule 19 parties and Rule 24 intervenors.
Subparagraph (2)(B) would maintain the present statute's abolition of the
necessary party/intervenor anomaly while providing an escape hatch allowing
supplemental jurisdiction when necessary to prevent substantial prejudice. The
escape clause would also reduce pressure on the "indispensable-necessary" party
distinction, freeing federal courts from the temptation to engage in the mind-
bending exercise of straining to find a nondiverse outsider not "indispensable" but
merely "necessary" so as not to have to dismiss a case. 7 At the same time, by
providing for uniform treatment of joined and intervening plaintiffs and
defendants, this subparagraph is meant to avoid creation of other anomalies.88 The
"defensive posture" exception made applicable by its position at the beginning of
subparagraph (2) might rarely be necessary, but it seems as sensible here as in
connection with the types ofjoinder covered in subparagraph (2)(A).
83. AMERICAN LAW INsTIrUTE, FEDERAL JUDIcIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, PRELIMINARY
DRAFTNo. 1, at 62 (1996) (draft 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b)(1)(B)).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
85. See Patterson Enters., Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (D.
Kan. 1993).
86. See supra text accompanying note 63.
87. See Rowe, supra note 34, at 979 & n.58.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
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RECODIFYING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
In some situations, courts may wish to join necessary parties because of effects
on their interests if they are not joined, even though they would not be parties to
a "claim." 9 Such joinder would be possible even without complete diversity
because the draft restricts only claims between nondiverse parties, without barring
the presence of such outsiders.
89. See Rowe et al., Reply, supra note 2, at 957-58.
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